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Abstract 
In professional sports, superstars can earn extremely high incomes compared with those 
of other players. The existence of superstars in team sports is interesting because, unlike 
in individual sports, it is the teams that compete, not the individual players. This paper 
examines the mechanism of how an individual player can be a superstar even in the 
context of team sports. The key to the mechanism is that the probability of winning differs 
tremendously depending on whether or not a team has top-ranked players (i.e., those with 
relatively high abilities). This factor, combined with the effect of ranking preference, 
means that the salaries of players increase exponentially from the bottom- to the top-
ranked player. As a result, a top-ranked player can be a superstar even in team sports.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In professional sports, superstars can earn extremely high incomes as compared with 
those of other players. Several models have been presented to explain why a superstar 
can be generated. An early and important work was that of Rosen (1981), which was 
followed by those of Adler (1985, 2006), Frank and Cook (1995), and Borghans and 
Groot (1998). Rosen (1981) attributed the extremely high incomes of superstars to 
differences in talent (quality) and to a special market structure (i.e., non-rivalry). Adler 
(1985) discussed “consumption capital,” and Borghans and Groot (1998) discussed the 
topic of “endogenous property rights” and monopoly power. Harashima (2016, 2017) 
presented an alternative model based on the concepts of ranking value and preference. 
People have a ranking preference because ranking is an important element in people’s 
lives and economic activities. Ranking preference is deeply rooted in the process of 
evolution of human beings, who have dominance hierarchies (cf., Landau, 1951; Bayly 
et al., 2006). An important point about ranking is that ranking value and preference 
provide monopoly powers and profits to the producers of products that have high ranking 
values. 
 The question arises, however, that even though superstars in individual sports 
can be explained by the above models, can superstars in team sports also be explained? 
In team sports, teams compete and championships are won by the team, not any individual 
player. Of course, individual achievements are possible in team sports (e.g., most valuable 
player), but they are not the main objective. Individual accolades are merely by-products 
of the team sport, but there are clearly superstars in team sports.  
Why do individual players become superstars and earn disproportionately large 
salaries in team sports? In a team sport, player salaries may have to be relatively more 
evenly distributed because championships are won by collaborative works of players. 
Unless a team intentionally distributes salaries extraordinarily unevenly to its players, a 
superstar will not be generated. In this sense, the idea of a superstar in team sports is 
puzzling. In this paper, I examine the generation mechanism of superstars in team sports 
on the basis of the concepts of ranking value and preference presented by Harashima 
(2016, 2017).   
 In Harashima’s model of ranking value and preference, there are two kinds of 
value: practical value and ranking value. Practical value is the value that people feel when 
consuming a good or service for practical purposes, and ranking value is the value that 
people feel from the rank of a good or service in a set of similar types of goods or services 
that people use, possess, or observe. An important point is that ranking value and 
preference provide monopoly powers to the producers of high-rank goods and services. 
Hence, if households’ ranking preference is strong enough, the highest-ranked producer 
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can be a “superstar.” 
 In this paper, I show that the probability of a win for a team differs largely 
depending on whether or not a team has high-ability (i.e., high-ranked) players. Because 
a win or loss is determined by relative differences in the performances of teams, players 
that are even a little better can play an important role in a team win. Because of this nature 
of the probability of winning, as well as the effect of ranking preference, salaries of 
players increase exponentially from the bottom- to the top-ranked player, and superstars 
can be generated in a team sport.      
 
2  RANKING VALUE AND PREFERENCE 
 
The model is based on the concepts of ranking value and preference that were first 
presented by Harashima (2016, 2017) and are briefly explained below. 
 
2.1  Ranking value 
Value is regarded as reflecting something useful. People feel, obtain, or consume value 
when using, enjoying, or consuming goods and services. Values derived from practical 
use have usually been considered in economics, but people also consume or feel value 
derived from ranking. For example, if a curio is evaluated to be the best among a set of 
similar types of curios, its price will be much higher than that of the others, even if the 
object is not practically useful. Its price is high only because of its top rank. People 
therefore obtain utility not only from practical uses but also from a sense of ranking. 
 Therefore, there are two kinds of value: practical value and ranking value. 
Practical value is the value that people feel when consuming a good or service for 
practical purposes. Ranking value is the value that people feel from the rank of a good or 
service in a set of similar types of goods or services that people use, possess, or observe. 
In other words, ranking value is the value people place on goods or services on the basis 
of their ranks (e.g., the ranking of a book on a best-seller list or that of a baseball team in 
a professional league).  
 
2.2  Ranking preference 
Goods and services have three properties: quantity, quality, and ranking. Quality is related 
to practical value, ranking is related to ranking value, and quantity is related to both. 
Suppose that the quality and ranking of each good or service are given exogenously and 
fixed. Here, for simplicity, I assume that there is only one type of good or service in the 
economy (these goods or services are hereafter called “goods”), and that all goods belong to 
this type and are substitutable for each other for households’ practical uses. Although the 
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goods are substitutable from the point of view of practical uses, they are differentiated 
from the point of view of ranking.  
 Let R (= 1, 2, 3, …) be the rank of goods. The good with R = 1 is most preferred 
by households. R = 2 indicates the next most preferred, and so on. For simplicity, no tied 
ranks are assumed. A household’s utility derived from consuming the good with rank R 
is  
 
𝑢(𝑞𝑛,𝑅 , 𝑞𝑙,𝑅 , 𝑅) 
 
where qn,R and ql,R are the quantity and quality of the good with rank R, respectively. For 
simplicity, the utility of the household is modified to  
 
𝑢(?̃?𝑅 , 𝑅) 
 
where
Rq
~ is the “quality-adjusted quantity” of the good with rank R, and
l,Rn,RR qqq 
~ .  
 The utility function has the following conventional characteristics: 
 
𝜕𝑢(?̃?𝑅 , 𝑅)
𝜕?̃?𝑅
> 0 
 
and 
 
 
𝜕2𝑢(?̃?𝑅 , 𝑅)
𝜕?̃?𝑅
2 < 0 . 
 
In addition, for any Rr ,  
 
𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟 + 1) < 𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟) 
 
and 
 
 𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟 + 2) − 𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟 + 1) > 𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟 + 1) − 𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟) . 
 
2.3  Monopoly power 
Ranking value and preference provide monopoly powers to the producers of high-ranked 
goods and services because selling ranking value to consumers requires no additional 
cost; that is, the marginal cost of producing a ranking value is zero, and thereby such 
producers can set prices above the marginal costs. If households’ ranking preference is 
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strong enough, the producer of the highest-ranked good can be a superstar.  
 
3  MECHANISM OF GENERATION OF 
SUPERSTARS IN TEAM SPORTS 
 
3.1  The environment 
Suppose that there is a professional sports league that consists of M teams and P players. 
Each team is assigned a “rank” of 1, 2, 3, etc., where the “rank 1 team” indicates the best 
team (the champion team), the “rank 2 team” indicates the next-best team, and so on. 
“Rank” is also assigned to players. It is assumed for simplicity that the roles of players 
on teams are identical. A “rank 1 player” indicates the best player, “rank 2 player” 
indicates the second best, and so on. Let ar be the ability of a player with rank r ( Pr ). 
It is assumed that ar is measurable and additive, and that all players have different abilities. 
Each team equally consists of n players, so P = nM. The “ability of a team” is the sum of 
the abilities of the n players who belong to the team. If the ability of a team is higher than 
that of an opposing team, the probability that that team will win the championships is 
higher than that of the opposing team. 
 It is assumed that each team’s revenue (ticket sales, the sale of broadcasting 
rights, license fees, etc.) depends entirely on its rank. Teams with a higher rank can enjoy 
stronger monopoly powers and obtain more revenue. Hence, the revenue (y) of a team is 
a function of the team’s rank m ( M ), such that  
 
𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑚) .                            (1) 
 
By the nature of ranking value and preference,  
 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑚
< 0 
 
and  
 
 
𝑑2𝑦
𝑑𝑚2
> 0 . 
 
As the ranking preference of people increases, y is larger for smaller m (i.e., for higher-
ranking teams). Therefore, equation (1) reflects the strength of people’s ranking 
preference.  
 Because the revenue of a team is determined solely by its rank, teams’ revenues 
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can be very different even if their abilities are almost the same. It is assumed for simplicity 
that there is no capital or other cost related to owning and operating a sports team except 
for player salaries. Hence, through competition among teams, all of the revenue of a team 
will be used for player salaries, and team revenue will eventually be equal to the sum of 
the salaries of the players on the team. 
 The abilities of people approximately follow a normal distribution, and top 
athletes correspond to the tail of the distribution of ability with regard to sports. Therefore, 
in a professional league, the abilities of players will increase approximately exponentially 
from the lowest-ability player to the highest, even though the differences will be small 
because there is an upper limit on human ability. Hence, it is assumed for simplicity that 
the ability of the players increases exponentially from the rank P player to the rank 1 
player, even though the absolute differences may be small.  
 
3.2  Player salary examples  
3.2.1  Example 1 
Suppose that there are only two teams and four players (player A, B, C, and D) in a league 
(i.e., M = 2, P = 4, and n = 2). The abilities of the four players are  
 
16181150 .ea .A  , 
1052110 .ea .B  , 
05121050 .ea .C  , and 
1Da  , 
 
where aA, aB, aC, and aD are the abilities of players A, B, C, and D, respectively. Abilities 
increase exponentially from players D to A, but the differences among their abilities are 
not large; in this case, the ability of A is 1.16 times that of D.  
 As assumed in Section 3.1, the probability of winning the championship is 
determined by the relative difference between the abilities of teams (i.e., between the 
sums of the two players’ abilities on the two teams). The probability of a win with each 
combination of players in the two teams is assumed as follows.  
 
 The probability that the team with players A and B ( 267.2 BA aa ) wins over 
the team with players C and D ( 051.2 DC aa ) is 1. Thereby, the probability 
that the team with players C and D wins over the team with players A and B is 0.  
 The probability that the team with players A and C ( 213.2 CA aa ) wins over 
the team with players B and D ( 105.2 DB aa ) is 0.8. Thereby, the probability 
 6 
that the team with players B and D wins over the team with players A and C is 0.2.  
 The probability that the team with players A and D ( 162.2 DA aa ) wins over 
the team with players C and D ( 156.2 CB aa ) is 0.7. Thereby, the probability 
that the team with players C and D wins over the team with players A and D is 0.3.  
 
These probabilities mean that even a small relative difference between the two teams’ 
abilities generates a large difference in the probabilities of winning.  
 The team that wins the championship has a revenue of 2, and the losing team has 
a revenue of 1. Hence, the total revenue of the two teams is 2 + 1 = 3. In addition, for any 
player, the probability of belonging to either of the two teams is 50%; that is, the players 
are indifferent between the two teams. Therefore, if a team hires player A, the expected 
revenue of the team (ΩA) is calculated by the average of revenues weighted by the 
probabilities of winning in the cases that player A is teamed with players B, C, and D. 
Hence, by using the above probabilities of winning the championship and the given 
revenue conditions,   
 
     
3
3070220802012 ....
ΩA

  
= 1.83 .                                          (2) 
 
Similarly, the expected revenues of the team if it hires the other players are   
 
ΩB = 1.5 ,                            (3) 
ΩC = 1.36 , and                        (4) 
ΩD = 1.3                                  (5) 
 
where ΩB , ΩC , and ΩD are the expected revenues of the teams that hire players B, C, and 
D, respectively. 
 Because both teams use all of their revenue for player salaries (as assumed in 
Section 3.1) and the probability of belonging to a team is identical for any team and player, 
the expected salary of a player is the average of the remaining three players’ salaries. 
Hence,   
 
3
DCB
AA
zzz
zΩ

  ,                     (6) 
3
DCA
BB
zzz
zΩ

  ,                     (7) 
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3
DBA
CC
zzz
zΩ

  , and                  (8) 
 
3
CBA
DD
zzz
zΩ

  .                    (9) 
 
where zA, zB, zC, and zD are the salaries of players A, B, C, and D, respectively. By 
equations (2) to (9),  
 
  50
2
3
.ΩΩzz BABA   ,                     (10) 
  20
2
3
.ΩΩzz CBCB   , and                    (11) 
  10
2
3
.ΩΩzz DCDC   .                    (12) 
 
By equations (10), (11), and (12),  
 
  zA = 0.5 + 0.2 + 0.1 + zD ,                   (13) 
zB = 0.2 + 0.1 + zD , and                      (14) 
zC = 0.1 + zD .                              (15) 
 
Because both teams use all of their revenue for player salaries, the total salary of all 
players is equal to the total revenue of the two teams (in this case, 3). Therefore, by 
equations (13), (14), and (15),   
 
 zA + zB + zC + zD = 1.2 + 4 zD = 3 .                  (16) 
 
By equation (16), zD = 0.45, and thereby, by equations (13), (14), (15), and (16),  
 
zA = 1.25 , 
zB = 0.75 , 
                                 zC = 0.55 , and 
zD = 0.45 . 
 
 The calculated salaries indicate that (1) the differences in salaries among players 
are far larger than those in their abilities (i.e., 78.2
D
A
z
z
 while 16.1
D
A
a
a
), and (2) the 
salary increases approximately exponentially as the rank of players rises from D to A.  
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3.2.2  Example 2 
In this example, the probabilities used in Example 1 are modified such that the probability 
of winning the championship is generalized as follows: 
 
 The probability that the team with players A and B wins over the team with C and 
D is u. Thereby, the probability that the team with players C and D wins over the 
team with A and B is 1 – u. 
 The probability that the team with players A and C wins over the team with B and 
D is v. Thereby, the probability that the team with players B and D wins over the 
team with A and C is 1 – v.  
 The probability that the team with players A and D wins over the team with C and 
D is w. Thereby, the probability that the team with players C and D wins over the 
team with A and D is 1 – w.  
 
Here, 0.5 < u ≤ 1, 0.5 < v < 1, 0.5 < w < 1, and w < v < u because of the differences in 
abilities of players. The other conditions are the same as in Example 1, and by the same 
procedure used in Example 1,    
 
 
2
zvu
zA

  , 
                              
2
2 wvu
zB

  ,   
                              
2
2 wvu
zC

  , and 
                              
2
2 wvu
zD

  .   
 
Hence,   
 
1 wvzz BA ,                       (17) 
vuzz CB   , and                     (18) 
wvzz DC  .                         (19) 
 
Because w < v < u, 
DCCB zzzz  . Thereby, by equations (18) and (19), the sequence 
of zD, zC, and zB can be approximated by an exponential increase from zD to zB. In addition, 
equations (17) and (18) indicate that, if the values of u, v, and w are sufficiently close (i.e., 
if they decrease gradually from u to w), then zA is far larger than zB. The gradual decrease 
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from u to w means that the probability of a win for the team to which player A belongs 
will not sharply decrease, even when the next highest-ranking teammate (B) is replaced 
with the lowest ranking player (D); that is, player A plays the pivotal role regardless of 
the teammate. If this condition is satisfied, the sequence of zD, zC, zB, and zA can be 
approximated by an exponential increase from zD to zA. 
 
3.2.3  Example 3 
In this example, the revenue used in Example 1 is generalized. A team’s revenue when 
the team wins the championship is changed from 2 to γ (> 1), whereas the revenue when 
it loses remains 1. The value of γ varies depending on equation (1); that is, γ reflects the 
strength of the ranking preference of people. The other conditions are the same as in 
Example 1. By the same procedure as used in Example 1,    
 
  2507505.01750 .γ.γ.zA  , 
  250250501250 .γ..γ.zB  , 
                      450050501050 .γ..γ.zC  , and   
                      55.00505.01050  γ.γ.zD . 
Figure 1: Values of the ratios 
B
A
z
z
, 
C
B
z
z
, and 
D
C
z
z
 
 
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
γ
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As γ increases, zA increases the most, followed by zB and zC; zD decreases. Figure 1 shows 
how the ratios
B
A
z
z
,
C
B
z
z
, and
D
C
z
z
change as γ increases. All three ratios increase as γ 
increases, and if γ is less than about 4, then 
 
  
D
C
C
B
B
A
z
z
z
z
z
z
  . 
 
Therefore, if γ is less than about 4, the sequence of zD, zC, zB, and zA can be approximated 
by an exponential increase from zD to zA. The case where γ is greater than about 4 is 
discussed in Section 3.3.3.  
 
3.2.4  Example 4 
Example 4 combines the generalizations given in Examples 2 and 3. Variables γ, u, v, and 
w are the same as those used in Examples 2 and 3, and the other conditions are same as 
in Example 1. By the same procedures used in Examples 1, 2, and 3,     
 
 
  
2
111 

wvuγ
zA  , 
  
2
111 

wvuγ
zB  , 
                       
  
2
111 

wvuγ
zC  , and 
  
2
111 

wvuγ
zD  . 
 
The basic features of Examples 2 and 3 are preserved in this more generalized example.   
 
3.3  Probability of winning and player salary 
The examples discussed in Section 3.2 show that player salaries will generally increase 
exponentially from the bottom- to the top-ranked player. In this section, I explore whether 
these results are to be expected, or whether they are an exceptional outcome or stem from 
unnatural parameter values.  
 
3.3.1  Probability of winning  
As was the case in Section 3.1, suppose that there are M teams and P players and each 
team consists equally of n players. The probability that a player of rank r belongs to a 
team of rank m is identical for any m and r. The ability of a team is the sum of the abilities 
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of all players who belong to the team, and the team with the higher total ability has a 
higher probability of winning the championship than its opponent. Although each team 
consists of n players, there are many possible combinations of n players on a team. 
Suppose that the number of possible combinations in which a player with rank r is 
included as one of the n players on a team is Λ. A natural number is assigned to each of 
the Λ possible combinations in order from 1 to Λ. Note that the number of possible 
combinations is commonly Λ for any r. 
 Let
ra
~ be the expected ability of a team to which rank r player belongs, and let
r,λa be the ability of team for a combination λ ( Λ ). Because the probability that a player 
with rank r belongs to a team with rank m is identical for any m and r, all of the 
combinations have an equal probability of being realized. Hence,
ra
~ is calculated by using 
the simple average of
r,λa such that 
 
 
 ?̃?𝑟 = 𝛬
−1 ∑ 𝑎𝑟,𝜆
𝛬
𝜆=1
 . 
 
 
ra
~ can be divided into two parts. One part is attributed to the combinations in 
which the player with rank r + 1 belongs to the team, and the other is attributed to the 
combinations in which the rank r + 1 player does not. Let 
1,
~
rra be the former and rra ,
~ be 
the latter. Thereby,  
 
  
rrrrr aaa ,1,
~~~    .                        (20) 
 
1
~
ra can similarly be divided into two parts: one attributed to the combinations in which 
the rank r player belongs to the team and the other in which the rank r player does not. 
Let 
rra ,1
~

be the former and
1,1
~
 rra be the latter. Thereby,  
 
  
1,1,11
~~~
  rrrrr aaa  .                      (21) 
 
 Because the combinations in which both the rank r and r + 1 players belong to 
the team is common in
ra
~ and
1
~
ra , then  
 
  
rrrr aa ,11,
~~
   .                         (22) 
 
By equations (20), (21), and (22),  
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1,1,1
~~~~
  rrrrrr aaaa                       (23) 
 
for any r. Here, because the abilities of players increase exponentially from the bottom to 
the top player,  
 
2,21,11,1,
~~~~
  rrrrrrrr aaaa  .                  (24) 
 
for any r. Therefore, by equation (23) and inequality (24),  
 
211
~~~~
  rrrr aaaa                         (25) 
 
for any r. Inequality (25) indicates that
ra
~ can be approximated by an exponentially 
increasing function of P – r; that is,
ra
~ increases exponentially as the rank of the player 
increases.  
 Because a win or loss is determined by the relative differences in teams’ abilities, 
as shown in Section 3.1, by inequality (25) the probability of a win for a team to which a 
player with rank r belongs can also be approximated by an exponentially increasing 
function of P – r. In addition, because a team’s revenue (Ωr) is determined by the 
probability of winning the championship as shown in the previous examples, Ωr can also 
be approximated by an exponentially increasing function of P – r. 
 
3.3.2  Amplified probabilities of a win  
3.3.2.1  Amplification 
Because only slight differences in teams’ abilities are decisive for winning and losing, 
even a small relative difference between the teams’ abilities will result in a large 
difference in the probabilities of winning and losing. This means that the ability 
differences are amplified in the differences in teams’ probabilities of winning the 
championship, as shown in Example 1.  
 Let Ψ (> 0) be the difference in the abilities of a team and an opposing team, and 
let  Ψp be the probability that the team with greater ability wins. Considering the 
amplification effect,  Ψp can be modeled as  
 
𝑝(𝛹) = 𝜌
1
2
+ (1 − 𝜌)
exp(𝜏𝛹)
2
  if 
𝜌
2
+ (1 − 𝜌)
exp(𝜏𝛹)
2
≤ 1  
(26) 
𝑝(𝛹) = 1                    if 
𝜌
2
+ (1 − 𝜌)
exp(𝜏𝛹)
2
> 1           
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where ρ (0 < ρ < 1) is the probability that a win or loss is determined by chance (in which 
case the probability of a win is
2
1
), and τ (> 0) is a parameter and represents the degree of 
amplification. If τ is sufficiently large,  Ψp is around unity even if the difference in 
abilities (Ψ) is very small. This means that relative superiority is the key for a win, even 
when the absolute difference in abilities is small. It seems natural that, in general, equation 
(26) holds and τ is sufficiently large. That is, the difference in abilities is greatly amplified 
in the difference in the probability of winning the championship. As a result, revenues 
(Ωr) will increase more sharply than players’ abilities (ar) do as r decreases from P to 1.   
 
3.3.2.2  Moderation 
However, even if τ is sufficiently large, it will not be too large; that is, cases in which Ψ 
is such that  Ψp is nearly equal to 1 will not often be observed in most professional 
sport leagues. Professional teams are generally also competing as profit-seeking firms 
and, as a result, the abilities of teams will nearly converge to a similar level. More 
importantly, even if the abilities of teams diverge greatly for some reason, this situation 
will be corrected by the governing authority of the league, because overly large 
differences in teams’ abilities will greatly reduce the total ranking value people feel from 
league games.  
 People may lose interest in a professional league if one particular team always 
wins, because they may judge that teams from different categories are competing in the 
games. If the result is evident before the games are played, people may not feel and extract 
enough ranking value from watching the games, so that the league may not be able to 
function successfully as a mechanism that provides ranking value to consumers. 
Therefore, overly large differences in abilities are problematic for sports leagues. Hence, 
if the abilities of teams become too divergent, the league authority may take some of the 
following measures: 
 
1) Introduce a draft for rookies.    
2) Introduce a cap on a team’s total player salaries. 
3) Pool some parts of teams’ revenues (e.g., broadcasting rights) that are later 
distributed to teams so as to equalize the abilities of teams. 
4) Change the game rules to increase ρ (i.e., a win or loss is more largely determined 
by chance). 
 
 The above corrections will continue to be strengthened until the total ranking 
value people feel and extract from league games is maximized.  
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3.3.3  Strength of ranking preference 
Examples 3 and 4 indicate that ability differences are amplified in salary differences 
through the effect of ranking preference (i.e., γ) because γ > 1. As the ranking preference 
of people becomes stronger (i.e., γ is larger), the salary differences grow larger, even if 
the players’ abilities are unchanged. Ωr and zr also increase more sharply than players’ 
abilities (ar) do as r decreases from P to 1. The strength of ranking preference is therefore 
a key factor that generates superstars in team sports. 
 Note, however, that Example 3 indicates that if γ (> 1) is very large (e.g., if γ > 
5 in Example 3), the salary of a player cannot be approximated by an exponentially 
increasing function of P – r, because zD decreases to zero and eventually becomes 
negative as γ increases. If a team offers negative salaries to players with lower ranks (i.e., 
zD < 0), those players will not join the league and teams will not be able to employ a 
sufficient number of players to sustain the league. Therefore, a league can be sustained 
only when the ranking value of a win relative to that of a loss (i.e., γ in Example 3) is not 
above some threshold value.  
 Normally, however, in a professional league the ranking value of a win for the 
top-ranked team will most likely not be tremendously greater than that of the bottom-
ranked team, because the players are all top athletes. There are usually many minor and 
amateur leagues for most sports, and the teams in a top-level professional sport league 
are all among the few top teams in the sport as a whole (i.e., including those in minor and 
amateur leagues). Hence, people generally will regard even the bottom-ranked team in a 
professional league as ranking sufficiently highly compared with all other teams. 
Therefore, the ranking value of a rank 1 team should generally not be much greater than 
that of the bottom team to exceed the sustainable threshold value. 
 
3.4  Mechanism of generation of superstars in team sports 
On the basis of the examples presented and examined in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, the salary 
of a player in a team sport can be modeled as follows. The ability of a rank r player is   
 
𝑎𝑟 = exp[𝛼(𝑃 − 𝑟)]                        (27) 
 
where α (> 0) is a parameter and aP = 1; that is, the ability of the rank P (lowest-ranked) 
player is normalized to be unity. As shown in Section 3.3.1, 
ra
~ and Ωr increase 
exponentially as r decreases (i.e., as rank rises), and as shown in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, 
any increase in ar is amplified in increases in Ωr by the effect of γ and  Ψp . 
 Ωr consists of the salary of the rank r player (zr) and the salaries of the other n – 
1 teammates. If P and n are sufficiently large, the salaries of the n – 1 teammates are 
approximately equal to the average salary of all players ( z ) times n – 1. Therefore, the 
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salary of the rank r player is approximately 
 
  znΩz rr 1  . 
 
Hence,  
 
 
11   rrrr ΩΩzz  , 
 
and by iterations, 
 
 
PrPr ΩΩzz   .                        (28) 
 
By equation (28), the salary of the rank r player (zr) is  
 
   PPrr ΩzΩz   .                       (29) 
 
Equation (29) indicates that zr is positively proportionate to Ωr. Because Ωr increases 
exponentially as r decreases from P to 1, as shown in Section 3.3.1, zr also increases 
exponentially. In addition, Ωr increases more sharply than does ar, as shown in the 
examples and discussed in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. As a result, the salary of the rank r 
player can be modeled as   
 
𝑧𝑟 = (𝑧𝑅 − 𝛿) + 𝛿exp[𝛼𝛽(𝑃 − 𝑟)]                  (30) 
 
where β (> 1) and δ (> 0) are parameters. 
 Compare equation (27), which describes a player’s ability, with equation (30), 
which describes a player’s salary. Both ability (ar) and salary (zr) increase exponentially 
from the bottom to the top player, but an increase in a player’s ability is amplified greatly 
in the corresponding increase in the player’s salary by β through the effect of γ and  Ψp . 
Therefore, even if α (> 0) is very small, αβ can be very large (i.e., even if the differences 
in players’ abilities are small, differences in their salaries can be very large). A few top 
players can thereby obtain extremely large salaries as compared with those of many other 
players and can become superstars in team sports. 
 
4  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper, the mechanism of generation of superstars in team sports is examined on 
the basis of the model of ranking value and preference presented by Harashima (2016, 
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2017). In this model, there are two kinds of value: practical value and ranking value. 
Ranking value and preference provide monopoly powers to the producers of highly 
ranked goods and services. If households’ ranking preferences are strong enough, the 
highest-ranked producer can be a “superstar.”  
 In team sports, unlike in individual sports, the monopoly producer is the team, 
not the individual player. Even so, I showed here that an individual player can be a 
superstar and earn a disproportionately large salary than other players in a team sport. An 
essential point in this mechanism is that the probability of a team winning differs 
depending on whether or not the team has high-ability players. This characteristic, 
combined with the effect of ranking preference, means that player salaries can increase 
exponentially from the bottom- to top-ranked players. As a result, top-ranked players can 
be superstars even in team sports.  
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